Lebanese Parliament member and political aide to Speaker Nabih Berri, Ali Hassan Khalil, traveled to Tehran this week in a visit that, while officially framed as participation in a conference, carried significant political weight, Asas Media revealed. 

The trip reportedly comes at a sensitive moment for Lebanon’s Shiite political establishment, which is facing one of its most challenging periods since the post-2005 rise of the community in national politics, reinforced after the 2006 war with Israel and consolidated following the 2007 Doha Agreement.

Since the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, the burden of representing the Shiite community has increasingly fallen on Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. The collapse of the so-called “Shiite Crescent” project after the fall of Syria’s Assad regime in December, along with escalating Iran-Israel tensions, has further intensified this pressure.

Berri has sought a pragmatic approach in recent months, maintaining support for state control over arms while avoiding moves that might destabilize the cabinet. But a recent “Open Letter” issued by Hezbollah disrupted the political balance, questioning prior commitments and signaling Tehran’s direct influence over strategic, military, and financial decisions. The letter, addressed to Lebanon’s top leadership, demonstrated that Hezbollah’s actions are now closely guided from Iran.

According to the report, MP Ali Hassan Khalil carried a letter from Berri to Iranian officials, notably Ali Larijani, Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and the key overseer of Lebanese affairs. Khalil’s mission had several clear objectives:

1. Seek Iran’s position on using UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism as references for any potential Lebanon-Israel negotiations.

2. Understand Tehran’s approach to any potential negotiations with Israel, particularly since the “Open Letter” appeared to challenge the principle of talks, which Berri would not oppose if conducted under the Mechanism with civilian experts included.

3. Determine whether Lebanon’s political and military moves are linked to broader U.S.-Iran negotiations, including the nuclear file and regional agreements.

4. Secure guarantees of Iran’s continued political and financial support for Lebanon’s Shiite community.

5. Clarify whether Hezbollah leadership was aware of Khalil’s visit and its objectives.

Observers note that Hezbollah has shown internal inconsistency since the assassinations of Nasrallah and other senior figures, both in public statements and closed sessions. For example, Hezbollah initially rejected a U.S. proposal to halt hostilities in Gaza, only for its media team to issue a statement welcoming Hamas’s eventual agreement.

Finding no definitive answers from Hezbollah leadership in Beirut, Berri turned to Tehran for clarity, the report noted. This underscores that Hezbollah’s leadership, weakened by continuous Israeli strikes, no longer controls strategic decisions independently—a reality reinforced during Larijani’s visit to Beirut last August, where he conveyed that the fate of Hezbollah’s arms is decided in Tehran, not Beirut.

It is also possible that Hezbollah encouraged Khalil’s mission to Tehran, recognizing its own limitations, much like Berri, and understanding that Lebanon must demonstrate flexibility on weapons, funding, and party reconstruction.