In a sign of how things have changed in Lebanon since the conflict began last Saturday, the Lebanese government took the decision on Monday to declare Hezbollah’s military and security activities illegal, and ordered the army to implement the decision. What was especially revealing is that two Shiite ministers appointed by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri voted in favour, despite Hezbollah’s anger.

Mr Berri’s break with the group on this occasion was a result of several developments in recent months, not least very different priorities when it comes to the future of the Shiite community. The Speaker, a premier political survivor, understands that his fellow Shiites suffered a devastating loss in the war of 2023-2024, and that any more such outcomes would have disastrous consequences for its power in Lebanon.

He also understood, as a political realist, that since the ceasefire deal of November 2024, many Shiites have been unable to return to their destroyed villages in the south and the Bekaa Valley, and that they are increasingly resentful. That’s why his main concern is to resume reconstruction in these areas, so that these people, among them many constituents, can return home. However, this won’t happen while Hezbollah remains armed.

Mr Berri took a risk in opposing the group, but for now the signs are that he may come out on top. Not only have the two Hezbollah ministers remained in the government – realising that if they withdrew, they would be held responsible for creating a rift in the Shiite community – but Mr Berri had a good sense of the pulse among his co-religionists, most of whom appear to view Hezbollah’s move as suicidal.

The Lebanese government’s decision came on a day when there was much speculation about what the Israelis would do. There is a growing belief in Beirut that Israel intends to invade more of the south, and on Tuesday Israeli officials announced that they were deploying more soldiers to the border area. The outcome could be dangerous, because the Israelis will not leave unless they can impose draconian conditions on the Lebanese.

What are these conditions? Almost certainly that any ceasefire deal, when it comes, include steps likely to lead to an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement, bringing Lebanon into a new Abraham Accord. It’s also very possible that Israel will look to impose a mechanism that allows it to have a say over security in the Lebanese-Israeli border area. Perhaps this would be an economic zone inside Lebanon, access to which would require Israeli approval, effectively filtering Lebanese entering their sovereign territory.

Such a situation could be put at the feet of Hezbollah, which in October 2023 embarked on a conflict with Israel it had no hope of winning. Yet the group doesn’t appear to have assessed the costs of its actions, mainly because its calculations today are not defined by Lebanon’s interests. Since the assassination of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, Iran has been in control and Lebanese considerations have been secondary.

By firing a handful of rockets at Israel on Monday morning, Hezbollah did precisely what the Israelis wanted the group to do. Reports also suggest that Hezbollah launched drones at the British sovereign base in Akrotiri, Cyprus. By committing such monumental errors, Hezbollah has ensured that virtually no one in Lebanon will regret its demise. On the contrary, the group is now navigating in hostile surroundings.

This is indeed a foundational moment for Lebanon, two decades after the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country in 2005. Hezbollah succeeded in filling the void at the time, at the cost of a near-civil war in 2008 and numerous political assassinations. But it’s impossible today to imagine that it will be able to reconstitute what it has lost.

That is why the Lebanese government’s decision to assert its right to be the sole decider on matters of peace and war was so fundamental. It was necessary to claim some form of legitimacy against a group that has operated in a grey zone outside legitimacy. The group’s officials have angrily condemned the government’s decision, but the reality is that Hezbollah is more or less helpless today to do much about it.

Yet one thing to bear in mind is that Lebanon will not necessarily benefit if Iranian hegemony over the country, following Syrian hegemony, is replaced by a new Israeli hegemony. Perhaps this is where Hezbollah, and behind it Iran, have been so blameworthy and irresponsible in facilitating such an outcome. They are guaranteeing that Lebanon will face new calamities down the road.

Even if Iran comes out of the current conflict stronger than before, Hezbollah is a different matter. The foundations of the group’s power – its influence over the state, its anchor in Lebanese society and the US and Israel’s willingness to accept the status quo – have all collapsed. The Lebanese government has shown it is committed to disarming Hezbollah, but even if this effort loses steam, the Israelis won’t stop.

Under these circumstances, Hezbollah’s war is not really one with the Lebanese state, but with itself. If it cannot define its identity primarily as a Lebanese one, it will find itself increasingly divorced from the environment in which it operates. No group can long survive if it is cut off from the realities surrounding it.