Four Scenarios Define Lebanon’s Fragile Road Ahead on Hezbollah Disarmament

The blood of Lebanese army soldiers killed in Majdal Zoun during the dismantling of a Hezbollah weapons cache marks the start of a delicate new chapter that the militant group appears intent on steering into turbulence amid ongoing defiance.

The weapons cache at the heart of the incident had already been inspected by both the French battalion and the Lebanese army. That meant the soldiers who entered the site did so in the belief there was no danger inside, until the blast occurred.

The attack signals the beginning of a long and painful test for the principle of placing all weapons under the sole authority of the State. 

Despite the risks, two cabinet decisions asserting the State’s exclusive right to arms are now irreversible, bolstered by both legal and international legitimacy.

The government decisions, issued on August 5 and August 7, 2025, reaffirm Lebanon’s commitment to the Taif Agreement as a constitutional and political framework and to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. That includes the provision limiting arms to the Lebanese state and extending its authority across the entire national territory.

In Lebanon, however, the problem has rarely been in the drafting of decisions but in their implementation. Since 1990, similar measures have been stalled by internal political balances and regional alignments, with partisan and geopolitical considerations blocking enforcement. 

According to a report published by Nidaa Al-Watan newspaper, four potential scenarios now face Lebanon in implementing the decisions on Hezbollah’s weapons and southern arrangements, each with significant consequences for stability.

Scenario One: Comprehensive Settlement

The government succeeds in fully disarming Hezbollah. Israel withdraws from remaining contested positions. Land and maritime borders are demarcated, opening the way for major Gulf and international investment to rebuild infrastructure and revive the economy. Security stabilizes, Iran’s influence in Lebanon wanes, and Hezbollah becomes solely a political party.

Initial steps would include bolstering the army south of the Litani River, securing borders, and — starting in October — gradually addressing weapons north of the Litani from the south upward. The plan would then move to imposing State authority on Palestinian camps in Beirut and its suburbs, ensuring full disarmament to prevent Hezbollah arms from being relocated there, followed by operations in Hezbollah-controlled areas of the southern suburbs and elsewhere.

Such a scenario would require a strong internal will to withstand Hezbollah provocations, or complex international arrangements, particularly involving Iran.

Scenario Two: Partial Settlement

Hezbollah relinquishes precision missiles and offensive drones but retains small arms and medium-caliber weapons under defensive arrangements. Some of the group's fighters are integrated into the army. Israel offers limited concessions and the ceasefire is extended for years. This would partially strengthen State authority while preserving Hezbollah’s political role, but would remain temporary and vulnerable to collapse. The international community currently rejects such an arrangement.

Scenario Three: Stalemate

Disarmament efforts stalls, Hezbollah’s weapons remain, and the ceasefire holds without political or security progress. The result: continued paralysis, internal division, suspended international aid, deepening economic crisis, and the consolidation of a “state within a State.” This scenario is dangerous for Lebanon both domestically and internationally, though unlikely given the strong political and international consensus for disarmament.

Scenario Four: Confrontation

An internal clash between Hezbollah and the army, or a full-scale war with Israel. The consequences would be devastating: widespread destruction, internal and external displacement, the collapse of State institutions, and heavy regional and international intervention. While possible in the event of miscalculation or major provocation, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are working to avoid this outcome.