As Syria navigates its political transition under interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, parallels are being drawn to another American-backed reshaping of the Middle East: the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Analysts and regional observers see echoes of past U.S. strategy—supporting former insurgents turned state-builders—in the current handling of Syria’s post-Assad order.

Al-Sharaa, a former jihadist commander and once U.S. designated terrorist, rose to power following the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024. Backed quietly by Western intelligence and openly supported by regional actors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, his ascent marks a dramatic shift in Syria’s decade-long civil war.

In a move reminiscent of Washington’s previous reliance on irregular forces to shape political outcomes, the U.S. is now providing limited tactical support and diplomatic recognition to al-Sharaa’s transitional government. The parallels to America’s post-2003 Iraq strategy are striking, as Washington once again works with former adversaries in hopes of achieving stability. “There was always the potential that once a power vacuum was created, it would be filled by someone who was associated with one of the more extremist or terrorist related groups,” said John Cohen, a former Department of Homeland Security undersecretary of intelligence, speaking to ABC News on January 15, 2025, about al-Sharaa’s rise.

Critics argue the strategy is dangerously shortsighted. Al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, previously led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a group with direct ideological lineage to al-Qaeda. Though now rebranded as a nationalist movement, many in the international community remain wary of legitimizing a figure whose past includes links to foreign jihadist networks.

The U.S. has a complicated history of supporting such figures. In the 1980s, Osama bin Laden—who would later orchestrate the 9/11 attacks—was reportedly aided indirectly through CIA-funded programs aimed at backing Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet occupation. Though the extent of bin Laden’s direct involvement with the CIA remains debated, his evolution from asset to adversary became a cautionary tale.

Now, some fear history could repeat itself.

Former U.S. intelligence officials have warned that empowering radical elements to serve short-term goals without a sustainable exit plan or institutional framework leads to instability, pointing to Afghanistan and Iraq as cautionary examples. The challenges facing Syria’s new leadership are already evident in dealing with foreign fighters. “The government has tried to isolate them,” said Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst on jihad and modern conflict at the International Crisis Group, speaking to The Washington Post on February 12, 2025. “But there’s a real issue with implementing the U.S. demand. They say all terrorists out, but that raises the question: Who are the terrorists?”

Al-Sharaa’s government has begun integrating former rebels into a national army, including foreign fighters previously labeled as extremists. Washington has signaled cautious approval, framing the initiative as a “practical necessity” to prevent renewed fragmentation. According to a Reuters report dated June 2, 2025, the U.S. has approved Syria’s plan to integrate around 3,500 foreign former jihadist rebel fighters into its national army, provided the process remains transparent.

The White House denies direct funding of al-Sharaa’s forces, though reports suggest that Western support—logistical and advisory—played a role in the coordination among rebel factions that ultimately pushed Assad out.

Yet, much like post-invasion Iraq, Syria now faces the monumental task of rebuilding a shattered state under a controversial leader. Al-Sharaa has pledged to embark on a political transition that could take up to four years to complete, including a national conference, an inclusive government and eventual elections. “The formation of a new government today is a declaration of our joint will to build a new state,” al-Sharaa said in a March 15, 2025 speech marking the formation of his transitional government, as reported by Al Jazeera. The government centralizes power in the executive branch, with al-Sharaa leading without a prime minister—fueling fears of authoritarian relapse.

In addressing the Syrian people, al-Sharaa has adopted a tone of humility, stating in a February 8, 2025 address: “I speak to you today, not as a ruler, but as a servant of our wounded homeland,” according to analysis by the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies. Yet his priority remains filling the government vacuum “in a legitimate and legal way” while preserving civil peace through transitional justice, as he told the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference on January 27, 2025.

Despite the uncertain future, Washington is pressing ahead with a policy many analysts say is driven more by regional containment—particularly against Iran and Russia—than by a clear vision for Syria’s internal reconciliation.

The situation presents a familiar dilemma: the U.S. caught between geopolitical imperatives and ground realities, backing a strongman with a militant past in hopes he becomes a statesman. The historical precedents from Iraq and the broader Middle East serve as sobering reminders of how such calculated gambles can unfold.