Most Lebanese hope to escape their difficult circumstances, and they can hardly be blamed for that. They have every right to build on any glimmer of hope and to wager on any opportunity, however risky.

They have lived through harsh conditions since the October 7, 2023 war in the Gaza Strip, followed by Lebanon’s “support war” and the regional expansion of the conflict. These developments only exacerbated an already abnormal situation.

As we know, this abnormal state of affairs is not new whether politically, militarily, or economically. However, developments over recent months, foremost among them Israel’s creeping occupation, have pushed parts of Lebanon’s governing establishment to take a step that Lebanese officials have rarely dared to take: direct negotiations with Israel under US sponsorship.

As we also know, those who chose this path of direct talks, fraught with risks and concerns, justified it by arguing that “there are no other options” given the prevailing regional and international balance of power.

In this context, several uncomfortable facts must be acknowledged:

First, the Arab world, and the Gulf region in particular, is today experiencing a far sharper polarization, both on the ground and in public sentiment, than anything related to Lebanon or the Lebanese state’s calculations of gain and loss.

Second, Iran, which before October 2023 exercised significant influence over the fate of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip, is now fighting for the survival of its besieged regime following the elimination of its Supreme Leader and many first-tier commanders, and after its cities and vital facilities became targets of American and Israeli military strikes.

Third, aside from diplomatic mediation efforts, there are no visible signs of effective and overt intervention by major global powers. This makes the continuation of the current war, albeit at varying intensities, more likely.

Fourth, contrary to some earlier expectations, the global economy has, so far, adapted to the abnormal situation in the Gulf region.

Against this backdrop, there is no doubt that the expansion of the US-Israeli war to encompass the broader Gulf region, with the possibility of extending into the southern Red Sea, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s escalatory rhetoric about moving to “strike Sunni Islam” - particularly Egypt and Türkiye - after “eliminating Shiite Islam,” are two dangerous realities that deserve close attention, even if Netanyahu is currently operating amid an election campaign aimed at preserving his leadership.

Past experience with Netanyahu leads any reasonable observer to expect the worst between now and October 27, the date of Israel’s general elections.

Anything is possible. Personally, I disagree with those who believe the Likud leader is conducting his election campaign solely within Israel.

Despite opinion polls indicating a major decline in popular support for Israel across Western Europe and the United States, I would argue that Netanyahu’s real bet is now focused - actively and perhaps successfully - on the levers of decision-making in influential capitals.

Drawing on his understanding of the effectiveness of these levers, and of the fragility of the loose international alliances that emerged against Israel after the Gaza massacres, Netanyahu - backed by the Israeli lobbying groups that support him - continues to maneuver, escalate, and exert pressure.

We must never forget that Israel encouraged the war against Iran, participated in it, and worked hard to expand it, in line with its stated objective of redrawing the Middle East’s regional map - from Türkiye in the north to Ethiopia in the south.

It is able to do so by leveraging its considerable influence within the “deep state” structures of major Western countries.

In Britain, for example, the resignation of Keir Starmer’s government absorbed much of the anger on the streets, but it did not alter London’s negative stance toward Gaza’s suffering or its unwavering support for Israel.

In Germany, the current government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz is considered one of the most pro-Israel administrations within the European Union.

And of course, in the United States, which is preparing for its midterm elections in early November, the growing voices of opposition across university campuses and among progressive activists have not yet translated into tangible political change. On the contrary, the positions of a number of Democratic leaders appear virtually indistinguishable from those of Republicans, whether in supporting Israel or in rejecting the proposals advanced by progressive and liberal Democratic activists.

A recent example was Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s public endorsement of Democratic candidate Haley Stevens, who enjoys strong backing from AIPAC, the most powerful pro-Israel lobby in the US. Stevens is running for a Senate seat against Arab-American candidate Dr. Abdul El-Sayed, and this contest is taking place in Michigan, home to one of the largest Arab and Muslim communities in the United States.

In conclusion, Lebanon, its neighboring countries, and the Gulf states have little choice but to strengthen their internal fronts in an unfavorable regional environment.

Internal resilience and the prevention of any security breakdown are vital necessities to avoid the combined dangers of external attacks and internal instability.