Lebanon has been waiting since 2022 for a U.S.-approved breakthrough that would allow the import of Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity via Syria, without breaching the Caesar Act sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. The long-awaited energy deal, involving Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, aims to alleviate the country’s crippling electricity shortages but remains stalled due to both geopolitical and domestic obstacles.

The contracts between the four countries were signed between early 2022 and June of that year, but implementation has been frozen. The prospect of receiving Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity offered a glimmer of hope for a country battered by years of economic collapse. That hope was briefly revived when then-President Donald Trump signaled a potential softening of sanctions, raising Lebanese expectations that a pathway to energy imports could finally open.

Yet despite intermittent optimism, the route remains blocked. The Caesar Act continues to cast a long shadow over the project, and Lebanon remains trapped between stalled reforms at home and Washington’s reluctance to make a definitive policy shift on Syria.

The fall of the Assad regime created an opening for Syria and neighboring states to rebuild economic relations that could benefit the broader region. Iraq, for instance, is eager to resume oil exports and expand infrastructure projects, including gas pipelines and a fiber-optic network. For Jordan, the regime's fall was seen as an opportunity to invalidate the Caesar Act and resume cross-border trade with Syria.

Lebanon, meanwhile, sees Syria’s potential exit from the sanctions regime as essential. Damascus is the key transit point for both Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity, as well as for Iraqi fuel—without which Lebanon cannot access these much-needed energy resources.

Access to gas and electricity has taken on critical urgency for Lebanon. Nearly three years have passed since the energy deal was first announced. Currently, Iraqi fuel provides just six hours of electricity a day, down from 12 to 18 hours in many regions before the 2019 crisis.

Increasing electricity supply through Jordanian power or Egyptian gas, used at Lebanon’s Deir Ammar power plant, could substantially reduce costs for households and businesses. That, in turn, could help revive economic activity in a country where inflation, unemployment, and poverty have surged in recent years.

Still, the deal hinges on two unresolved issues: a definitive lifting of U.S. sanctions and Lebanon’s own failure to implement a list of reforms. The World Bank has offered a $270 million loan to finance the annual import of 650 million cubic meters of Egyptian gas and 250 megawatts of electricity from Jordan. But disbursement depends on long-standing conditions that Lebanon has yet to meet.

These include appointing a national electricity regulatory authority, improving electricity bill collection, and cracking down on widespread theft from the power grid. To date, none of these steps have been fully implemented, stalling the World Bank’s decision.

“Lifting sanctions on Syria doesn’t happen with the push of a button,” economist Jassem Ajaka told Al-Modon. “It will take time, and even then, it might be a gradual process.”

Ajaka noted that easing sanctions would create significant opportunities for regional cooperation, especially between Lebanon and Syria. But it could also fuel competition, especially if Syria begins to attract foreign investment for its post-war reconstruction. According to him, the impact of sanctions relief on energy projects “will likely be felt one to two years after the decision is made.”

The current gridlock is not surprising. Back in March 2022, then-U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea told former Energy Minister Walid Fayad that the U.S. remained committed to “advancing regional energy deals,” but cautioned that these agreements were “long and complex processes.”

For now, the energy corridor through Syria remains insecure as two key conditions are still unmet: full political stability in Syria and the lifting of U.S. sanctions. Without both, the infrastructure remains vulnerable to sabotage, and Egypt and Jordan risk facing penalties for violating U.S. law. Lebanon, too, remains exposed under the Caesar framework.