Last week, the US envoy for Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, attended a session of the committee established to monitor the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire put in place almost a year ago. Ms Ortagus brought with her a proposal for how negotiations between the Lebanese and Israelis could proceed.

The ceasefire expanded the so-called Mechanism put in place after the July 2006 war. This is a co-ordination committee to supervise implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The ceasefire agreement added two new members – the US and France – to the tripartite format of Lebanon, Israel and Unifil, the UN force in southern Lebanon, that had been in place, with the US now presiding.

The Mechanism is made up mainly of military representatives, but the US and Israel want to widen this to include civilian representation. Ideally, both countries would like to lock Lebanon into a normalisation process with Israel, something the Lebanese reject for now. Their preference is for indirect negotiations, through the Americans, which is how Lebanon and Israel delineated their maritime border in October 2022.

Last March, Axios reported that Lebanon and Israel would soon establish working groups that would be “led by diplomats from the US, Israel and Lebanon” to address outstanding issues – demarcating the Lebanon-Israel land border, securing the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel and agreeing conditions for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese areas it occupies. US officials were cited in the story.

On the Lebanese side, however, this was news. Lebanon had not agreed to participate in working groups headed by diplomats. According to Lebanese media reports, two months ago, Ron Dermer, Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister, asked the UN representative in Lebanon to convey to the Lebanese a proposal for direct talks. Their answer was the same: Lebanon would negotiate only through the Mechanism.

On her latest trip to Lebanon, Ms Ortagus floated a compromise. She asked the Lebanese to add civilians to the military team participating in the Mechanism. This came shortly after President Joseph Aoun, talking about the Gaza ceasefire deal on October 13, had said: “The general atmosphere today is one of settlements, therefore it is necessary to negotiate [with Israel]; as for the form of the negotiation, this will be determined at the [proper] time.”

Facing mounting pressure, including escalating Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon, senior Lebanese officials are said to have reached agreement on a median proposal: they would be willing to expand the military delegation to include civilians, who would participate in discussions on certain matters principally as technical advisers.

Lebanon has a narrow domestic margin of manoeuvre on the negotiating front. Faced with a Hezbollah refusal to speak directly with the Israelis, and similar opposition from Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, Mr Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have to thread a needle: liberating Lebanese land while not clashing with the Shiite parties, keeping the Americans onside and avoiding war with Israel.

The real question is whether the Israelis and Americans will accept the Lebanese compromise. From Lebanon’s perspective, the idea of having civilians advise military personnel harks back to the 1949 armistice agreement with Israel, when civilian technical advisers were used. What Hezbollah and Mr Berri oppose, however, is a format similar to the one that led to the May 17, 1983 Lebanon-Israel withdrawal agreement, when the Lebanese team was led by a retired diplomat.

For Mr Berri, who at the time was an ally of Syria, the 1983 agreement was tantamount to a peace accord with Israel, making it unacceptable. It was and it wasn’t. The agreement stipulated that each country would not to be used as a base for hostile actions against the other and Lebanon agreed to set up a security region in the south in which Beirut would accept security arrangements. But it did not establish diplomatic ties, even if it set up a committee to address “the development of mutual relations”.

More important from Lebanon’s perspective at the time, the agreement created conditions for a full Israeli withdrawal from the country. Mr Aoun’s recent remarks showed he is aware that such an equation holds today, namely that Israel will demand a price for pulling its forces out of the south. The question is what?

Complicating matters is that Hezbollah, and above all Iran, are not willing to give anything up in Lebanon unless, or until, they receive something in exchange. Hezbollah’s inflexibility on surrendering its weapons is very much an effort to ensure Iran does not lose a valuable regional political card – one Tehran will try to use in negotiations with the Americans, but also with the Lebanese.

The only problem with this thinking is that the Israelis have no intention of granting Iran such latitude. This makes it more likely that, even if a new Israeli onslaught on Lebanon may not be imminent, further deadlock down the road in disarming Hezbollah will probably lead to a resumption of the war. The outcome of such a conflict would almost certainly be further Hezbollah concessions.

Why reach that stage? If Lebanon can derail a war by engaging the Israelis in talks on the land border, prisoners and an Israeli withdrawal, then it must consider this option. An end to cross-border conflict and security arrangements with Israel are not a peace deal, and no one ever accused Lebanon of making peace when they signed the armistice agreement. Any step that can restore that agreement, or an updated version of it, should be welcomed.

Whether it’s an officer or a civilian negotiating is irrelevant.