In January, newly-elected Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, after parliamentary consultations, appointed Nawaf Salam as prime minister. A little over three weeks later, following two years of governance by a caretaker cabinet, Salam unveiled a 24-member cabinet, pledging to prioritize financial reforms, postwar reconstruction, and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement with Israel reached last November that is aimed at stabilizing Lebanon’s border with Israel.

With a distinguished career as a diplomat and judge, Salam has long been a vocal advocate of reform, extending beyond Lebanon’s more urgent challenges. His book, Lebanon Between Past and Future (originally Le Liban d’hier à demain in French), offers a roadmap for governance and institutional change, providing insights into the principles that may shape his tenure. As Lebanon grapples with immense challenges—reasserting its sovereignty, navigating an economic collapse, and contending with regional instability—Salam’s leadership will likely be judged in light of the principles he put forward in the book.

Originally appearing in French and Arabic in 2021, and later translated into English in 2023, Lebanon Between Past and Future examines Lebanon’s modern history while envisioning a potential future. Published in the wake of the 2019 protest movement but before the events of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israel-Hezbollah war, the book reflects on Lebanon’s political dysfunction and the structural changes necessary to prevent further deterioration. Through a collection of essays spanning decades, Salam evaluates the country’s sectarian power-sharing system, calls for constitutional reform, and examines Lebanon’s trajectory from independence to its current crises.

Salam structures his analysis around key themes that have defined Lebanon’s enduring political and institutional challenges. He dissects the country’s historical identity as host to a pluralistic society, shaped by competing narratives since the formation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. One of his main points is to offer a critique of sectarianism as the root cause of “unfulfilled” Lebanese citizenship. According to Salam, the dominance of sectarian groups—each sustaining itself through “fictional narratives”—has prevented the Lebanese from fully embracing a unified national identity.

He argues that sectarianism has crippled state institutions, turning them into tools for political patronage rather than governance. Instead of providing equitable public services to citizens, the state relies on sectarian leaders to fill the gaps, thereby reinforcing sectarian dependency and further eroding national cohesion. Lebanon, he insists, must move toward a modernized state that upholds the rule of law and guarantees fundamental freedoms. “The stronger the state, the more the individual is respected,” he observes, echoing sociologist Emile Durkheim—a particularly apt observation, Salam believes, for a country where community-based loyalties often outweigh national identity.

Salam examines Lebanon’s history of conflict, particularly the 1975–1990 civil war and its lingering repercussions. He warns that unless Lebanon resolves its internal tensions, it will remain vulnerable to regional upheavals. While he attributes the war’s origins primarily to domestic grievances—particularly the lack of inclusion (al-musharaka) that primarily left-wing and Muslim factions resented within what was then a Christian-dominated political system—he also acknowledges the role of external factors, such as the presence of the “Palestinian resistance movement” in Lebanon after 1969.

Salam also dissects the war’s aftermath. He assesses the 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the conflict but in his view also failed to lay a sustainable foundation for governance. Although the agreement reinforced sectarian quotas, Salam sees it as a necessary but incomplete step toward reform. He argues that its unimplemented provisions, including administrative decentralization, judicial strengthening, and the formation of a national committee to propose steps for abolishing political confessionalism, should be revisited. He dismisses proposals for Lebanon to adopt sectarian-based federalism, an idea that has resurfaced in Lebanese political discourse, as unrealistic, a view similar to the one he takes toward partition.

Looking beyond Taif, Salam envisions a new political order that transcends sectarian constraints and fosters genuine democratic participation. He emphasizes judicial reform, asserting that Lebanon’s justice system is paralyzed by sectarian interference. “An accusation against—or even an attempt to accuse—a high-ranking civil servant of malfeasance risks being portrayed as an attack on the community to which he belongs,” he writes. This challenge is evident today in major national issues, such as the investigation of the Beirut Port explosion of August 2020, where hopes for accountability have been undermined by political obstructionism and sectarian interests.

Electoral reform is another pillar of Salam’s vision. He supports proportional representation and electoral districts based on the muhafaza, or governorate, rather than the qada, or smaller administrative district, alongside a preferential voting system (expanded from one choice, as is the case today, to two or more) that fosters national rather than sectarian allegiances. He also proposes additional reforms, including lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen and allowing citizens to vote in their place of residence or work, alongside their ancestral village. Such potential reforms take on added significance as Lebanon prepares for parliamentary elections in 2026, which the Salam government will be responsible for organizing.

If the book is any indication, and if Salam finds himself in power long enough, his tenure will likely focus on strengthening the state at the expense of sectarian power structures, ensuring judicial independence, and advancing decentralization. Yet now that he’s prime minister, Salam faces the challenge of translating his ideas into policy. His approach to forming a government suggests a quiet but firm commitment to the principles outlined in Lebanon Between Past and Future. His selection of ministers and the speed with which he assembled his cabinet indicate a preference for decisiveness over protracted political bargaining. Interestingly, one of his reform proposals is an amendment requiring a prime minister-designate to present a cabinet lineup within 30 days of his or her appointment, or be considered resigned. In a demonstration of his commitment to this principle, Salam proposed a cabinet within 26 days of his appointment (30 days after Aoun’s election).

The absence of a clear economic vision is a major gap in his book, however. While Salam offers a sharp appraisal of Lebanon’s political system, he says little about the economic reforms necessary to support his broader state-building agenda. This omission leaves a crucial part of Lebanon’s recovery puzzle unresolved.

Salam opens his book with a quote from Antonio Gramsci: “The old world is dying, the new is yet to be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” Indeed, Lebanon’s post-Taif order is unraveling and the country stands at a crossroad. Will Salam succeed in shaping a new Lebanon according to his vision, or will his premiership become yet another chapter in the country’s morbid cycles of political deadlock? His leadership will ultimately be measured against the ideals he championed in his book and the depth of his ability to navigate Lebanon’s entrenched political realities.