MP Salim Sayegh warned Sunday that Lebanon risks being pulled into negotiations “under fire” unless the government moves faster on the diplomatic and security fronts, arguing that Israel “will not wait” and that Beirut must act quickly to protect its national interests.

Speaking on Al-Jadeed TV, Sayegh commented on the appointment of former Ambassador Simon Karam to represent Lebanon on the so-called “mechanism” committee, saying the move alone would not be enough to deter Israel or shift the trajectory of events.

“Escalation is still very much in the cards, and the negotiation track remains separate from all other tracks,” Sayegh said. “It is in Lebanon’s interest to persist in a diplomatic–security–military channel, especially since Israel will not wait. The war has not stopped. When 400 Hezbollah fighters were killed over the past year, that alone means the war never actually ended, and we may ultimately find ourselves negotiating under fire.”

Sayegh said Lebanon is facing decisions that require the state to “act more quickly.” While he welcomed the appointment of a seasoned diplomat, he argued the step falls far short of what the moment demands.

“Sending an experienced diplomat is important and we support it, but I believe the decision is not enough to deter Israel or save Lebanon from an inevitable strike,” he said. “I fear time may have already passed us by.”

He outlined two competing approaches to a peace process: one that starts with technical issues, then moves through economic and ultimately political phases, and another that declares peace as the explicit goal from day one, with the roadmap built around that objective.

Drawing on his own experience, Sayegh said negotiators should be chosen first and foremost on the basis of trust, followed by competency.

“You appoint the ambassador, then determine Lebanon’s priorities so the mandate is clear and cannot be undermined later,” he said.

That clarity, he added, gives a negotiator the ability to maneuver in high-pressure environments.

“You may enter a place with no communication links, and the person sitting across from you — or in a side room — may need an immediate answer. You must know how to find a way out, when to take initiative, and when to commit if you’re convinced, so you don’t appear to be merely a messenger.”

Sayegh said any negotiator must be supported by a full team of technical experts, political scientists and legal advisers. He referenced similar teams assembled under former President Michel Sleiman, and recalled his own role in Amine Gemayel’s negotiation team during the 2006 national dialogue led by Speaker Nabih Berri; a role he held because he was not a member of Parliament at the time.

“But the personality of the negotiator also matters,” he added. “If the mandate is purely technical or security-focused, we would be fooling the international community. They will tell us: don’t try to be clever as more is required.”

Shifting to the 1983 May 17 Agreement, Sayegh noted that its official title — the Agreement on the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces — made clear that its ambitions went no further than securing an Israeli pullout. The deal preserved all Lebanese territory, “land and sea,” which he argued was “far better” than the maritime border arrangement Lebanon later accepted.

Under the accord, the Lebanese Army was to deploy in southern Lebanon at graduated force levels to reassure Israel that no attack would originate from Lebanese soil. Yet Sayegh said the agreement failed because Israel itself sank it.

“It was not in Israel’s interest,” he said, pointing out that the accord won Cabinet approval and was ratified twice by Parliament. “This embarrassed Israel, which wanted a peace treaty. Israel concluded the Lebanese state could not commit to anything as long as the Syrian army remained in Lebanon. At the last moment, it sent Washington the famous message: ‘I will not withdraw before Syria commits to a simultaneous withdrawal,’ killing the agreement before it was born.”

Sayegh praised the position of the late President-elect Bashir Gemayel, describing how he traveled to Kiryat Shmona to protect Lebanese civilians and refused to sign a peace treaty until Lebanon itself was ready.

“He didn’t hide or use his people as human shields. He confronted the challenge head-on.”

Today, he argued, the logic of May 17 — and the notion that Lebanon can hide behind the armistice agreement — “is over.”

“What is required internationally is a political process without waiting for better circumstances,” he said. “I fear we may miss the train. Today we speak of peace; tomorrow we might be speaking of surrender.”

Sayegh noted that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government has secured Parliament’s confidence, including from blocs aligned with Hezbollah.

“This means they empowered the president and the government to speak on their behalf,” he said.

But even with a clear mandate, he warned, a negotiator “cannot achieve what he wants unless there is national unity.”

“Today, an overwhelming majority of Lebanese say ‘no’ to weapons outside the state,” he said. “Even Speaker Berri says he wants arms limited to the state. He has said this in Parliament, repeatedly.”

He cautioned that political rhetoric undermining the negotiation track directly strengthens Israel’s hand.

“If we undermine the negotiator’s position outside the negotiation room — for example, when Sheikh Naim Qassem says these discussions will lead to civil war — what am I offering the Lebanese negotiator? Civil war? That serves Israel’s interests.”

Weapons outside state control, he said, are blocking Lebanon’s prosperity, reconstruction and economic recovery.

“Our source of strength is national unity.”

Sayegh invoked Ayatollah Khomeini’s reluctant acceptance of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, likening Lebanon’s situation to a moment requiring similar historical courage — specifically, a decision by Hezbollah to “hand over all its cards” to President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam.

“That would strip Israel of its excuses, reassure the public, and allow the party to re-enter Lebanese society as a political actor,” he said. “But having two states — the sovereign Lebanese state and the Hezbollah state with its own security-military apparatus — is not a source of strength. We all reject it. How can the party claim to be with the state while fighting against it?”

He urged President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam to adopt “stronger political positions,” and said Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem must take a “major move” that could shift the trajectory of events.

“Today Iran has effectively freed the party, saying, ‘We have nothing to do with you; you are an independent institution and make your own decisions,’” Sayegh said.

Qassem, he argued, should take a distinctly Lebanese step — one he said the late Hassan Nasrallah intended to take when he reportedly agreed to a ceasefire before the Gaza war ended, shortly before his assassination.

“The ceasefire agreement was issued on November 27, 2024, three months later — an agreement that cemented defeat and reverted to Resolution 1701,” he said.

Sayegh concluded that Lebanon still has viable diplomatic options but faces narrowing time.

“We support Presidents Aoun and Salam, and hope they accelerate the diplomatic path,” he said. “But I am convinced Netanyahu will accept only the timeline he himself has laid out, unless Sheikh Naim Qassem takes a step that removes the fuse from Netanyahu’s hand.”