As the government of Bashar Al Assad in Syria collapsed, Hezbollah and Iran were watching closely to see how this would affect their weapons supply lines between Iraq and Lebanon. Even before Mr Al Assad fled his capital, the news last Friday that the Albukamal crossing had been taken over by the Syrian Democratic Forces, a US ally, must have been harsh, since the crossing was used to rearm Hezbollah.

More broadly, what the region has been witnessing is the crippling of the so-called Axis of Resistance that Iran had built up over the years – the regional alliance of states and non-state actors, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, Syria under Mr Al Assad, the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as sectarian Islamist militias from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7 last year, this network sought to respond in a co-ordinated way to the Israeli retaliation against Gaza. It did so under the rubric of a highly perilous strategy devised by Iran and its allies called the “unity of the arenas”, which held that if Israel attacked one member of the Axis of Resistance, other members would intervene in support of their ally.

The consequences were catastrophic for the Axis. Ironically, Mr Al Assad appeared to have anticipated the risks, and tried to steer Syria clear of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. However, this could not save him, as the Lebanese conflict’s undermining of one of the main pillars supporting his rule, namely Hezbollah, may have accelerated the offensive against the areas his government controlled at the time, even if it was not necessarily the cause.

In Lebanon, until Mr Al Assad’s downfall, Hezbollah and Iran always sought to return to the situation in which they found themselves prior to October 7 last year. There was something profoundly unrealistic in such thinking, particularly after the Israelis launched their onslaught against Lebanon in September that targeted Hezbollah and led to the killing of its former secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. While the environment had changed, Hezbollah and Iran persisted in putting up a front suggesting that nothing had.

Hezbollah continues to adopt this pose, with its secretary general, Naim Qassem, seeking to limit the scope of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in a speech on social media last Thursday, arguing that the resolution only applies south of the Litani River. In fact, it encompasses much more, reaffirming another resolution, Resolution 1559, which aims to disarm all militias in Lebanon.

The end of Mr Al Assad’s rule has completely transformed the regional context. Iran’s network of alliances may still exist on paper, but its linchpin, Syria, is no more. Hezbollah now finds itself isolated in Lebanon, facing a society in which most political factions deeply oppose the party’s retention of its weapons. Gone are the days when Iranian officials could fly into Beirut to issue instructions to Lebanese officials.

Additionally, of what value is the Axis of Resistance if Israel has so thoroughly reworked the deterrence equation to its advantage? In other words, if attacking Israel invites major retaliatory destruction of the territories of the Axis, especially of Iran itself, how probable is it that members will engage in future military actions against Israel?

Hezbollah may soon feel the backlash of anger from Lebanon’s Shiite community. Already, there is much denigration of Iran within the community, which feels Tehran abandoned it. Mr Al Assad’s suspiciously swift demise will only add to its mistrust. What were years of sacrifice for, many will ask, when young Hezbollah men went to fight and be killed in Syria?

What purpose did Hezbollah’s opening of a front with Israel serve, other than to bolster Iran and its interests? Large swathes of Shiite-majority areas in Lebanon now lie in ruins, all to preserve an Iranian-led alliance that folded like a cheap suit in Damascus.

Starting today, Hezbollah and the Iranians will need to reconsider their entire regional strategy. Iran’s power was anchored in fragmented societies in dysfunctional Arab states – states often perverted to serve Tehran’s interests. This has already generated great resentment throughout societies in the Middle East.

Hezbollah, too, must engage in a full reassessment of its actions in Lebanon and Syria. It can no longer ignore that its behaviour at home provoked considerable hostility among the various communities, which left the party hanging alone in its war with Israel. Mr Nasrallah’s killing, and that of his apparent successor, Hashem Safieddine, compelled Iran to take a leadership role in Hezbollah that only further distanced it from Lebanon’s reality. Yet for now, the party stubbornly refuses to engage in a mea culpa, and it is likely to continue defending its weapons whatever happens.

If it does so, this would be another sign of its hubris and tone-deafness. Until a few days ago, Mr Qassem vowed to stand by Syria against the “terrorist groups”, though Mr Al Assad’s fate was sealed. The new secretary general is, plainly, no more than a facade of Iranian power, but Hezbollah would be making a mistake to presume it can survive in the treacherous Lebanese sectarian context if it remains an Iranian ventriloquist’s dummy.

Hezbollah may be making a similar mistake as Mr Al Assad. He refused to negotiate when he had the upper hand, not wanting to concede anything from a position of strength, in favour of valuable gains. That is why he lost everything. By refusing to make concessions in Lebanon, Hezbollah, too, may soon find itself having to choose between increasingly dismal options.