US President Donald Trump has bluntly signaled, several times, that he would encourage a military intervention in Lebanon by the forces of Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa. His logic seems to be that in the same way Al-Sharaa’s forces succeeded in toppling Bashar Assad and his regime in Syria, who had support from Hezbollah fighters, they could also defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, any Syrian intervention in Lebanon would be disastrous, with an even worse outcome than the decades-long military occupation by the former Assad regime.

Al-Sharaa has stated clearly he has no intention of ordering any aggressive action in Lebanon; he said during a recent TV interview that he wants to help the country but not through military intervention. Still Trump continues to suggest it. Al-Sharaa’s forces are working hard to ensure Syria’s borders are protected and there is no flow of arms through the country to Hezbollah. However, there is a big difference between doing that and taking the fight to the group in Lebanon.

To begin with, post-Assad Syria does not yet have a solid, fully fledged army. Its armed forces are still in their infancy; it is more a group of military factions that constitute the start of a project to build a future conventional army. The immediate aim is to deploy those forces to exert the authority of the new state over all of Syria — a significant challenge in itself, given the current situation and capabilities. To also attempt to expand into military action in a neighboring country would be a huge stretch. However, it is difficult for Al-Sharaa to respond to Trump with a straight “no.” The new authorities in Syria need the support of the US. No economic development can happen unless international sanctions are lifted permanently. Therefore, Trump has the upper hand.

The US president has suggested Al-Sharaa’s forces could do a better job of finishing off Hezbollah than Israel has managed, and so he should order them into Lebanon. Al-Sharaa has no intention of doing so, however; his main priority as far as Lebanon is concerned is to ensure it does not become a nuisance to the new Syrian regime. This potentially problematic issue was skillfully resolved by Turkiye. There had been talk of Hezbollah harboring former Assad officers and plotting to destabilize the new regime in Syria, for example. The Turks skillfully neutralized this threat.

Al-Sharaa, meanwhile, initially demanded that the Lebanese government hand over Hezbollah operatives who had committed crimes in Syria, a stance that risked reinforcing divisions in Lebanon. He subsequently dropped the demand, as Turkiye continues to act as moderator to ensure Hezbollah does not pose a threat to Syria, or vice versa.

If Syrian forces did enter Lebanon, it would open old wounds; many Syrians fought against Assad’s army and its allies, and are unlikely to soon forget the brutality of Hezbollah’s fighters in Syria; the crimes committed against the Syrian people during the long civil war; the siege of Madaya and Zabadani in 2015, where children and the elderly died as a result of lack of food and medicine; being driven from their homes in Al-Qusair; or the crimes in Deir Ezzor, Daraa, Qalamoon, and even in Damascus. Al-Sharaa has said that states cannot be built on revenge. However, it might be difficult to convince the average soldier, especially if he had been personally affected by Hezbollah’s brutality.

Meanwhile, Trump’s logic, that Al-Sharaa’s forces would do a better job of defeating Hezbollah than Israel, does not take into account the social and confessional mix in Lebanon. It would spark a Sunni-Shiite clashes that until now have been avoided. Many Lebanese neighborhoods have a mix of Sunni and Shiite residents, and any intervention of the type Trump suggests would lead to increasing polarization. In December, when opposition groups took to the streets of Lebanon to celebrate the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime, violent clashes took place in the south, in Saida, and in the north, in Bab Al-Tabbane, and other places.

What if Syrian forces marched into Lebanon to confront Hezbollah? It is very likely that Lebanese Sunnis would side with Al-Sharaa, creating friction with their Shiite fellow citizens. A Syrian intervention in Lebanon is widely rejected, then, not only by Al-Sharaa but by most Lebanese factions. There are some who would welcome it, however, even if indirectly.

Charles Jabbour, the head of outreach and media relations with the Lebanese Forces political party, said in a message posted on social media platform X that to prove himself to the US, Al-Sharaa should take action to end Hezbollah’s presence along the border between Lebanon and Syria. However, the head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, said in a newspaper interview that the party did not support any such intervention and Lebanese officials would not ask Syria to intervene.

Nevertheless, some view an intervention by Syria as potentially the most effective way to finish off Hezbollah, despite the unrest that might follow any such development. Israel would certainly be very happy to see Hezbollah bogged down by internal unrest. Their only concern would be Al-Sharaa’s close relationship with Ankara; the last thing Israeli authorities would want to see on their border is a force they would consider a Turkish subordinate.

Regardless of the potential challenges and negative consequences, Trump does not seem inclined as yet to drop his request for Al-Sharaa to intervene in Lebanon. While Syria is not in a position to respond to the White House with an outright “no,” Al-Sharaa might consider floating a few demands as a prerequisite to any official response to Trump.

This might buy some time for Al-Sharaa, but eventually there will need to be an alternative solution that can be offered to Trump. This is where input from other countries in the region should come in, to help develop an executable plan. The alternative would be regional forces that will stabilize Lebanon and create a buffer between Israel and Hezbollah.